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I. INTRODUCTION
This Survey covers a number of notable bankruptcy opinions in the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and three decisions handed
down by the U.S. Supreme Court. These courts addressed some challeng-
ing issues, including (1) whether good faith bars a finding of civil con-
tempt; (2) whether the rejection of a trademark license is the functional
equivalent of rescission; and (3) whether a creditor’s injury is direct or
derivative. This Survey also addresses three pieces of bankruptcy legisla-
tion that were enacted in 2019, all of which seek to expand the Bank-
ruptcy Code’s protections to certain debtors. The authors have selected
these topics based on their importance to future bankruptcy practice, and
we hope that the discussion below may continue to be useful to consumer
and business bankruptcy practitioners.
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II. DISCHARGE
A. FAMILIAR TERRAIN: THE SUPREME COURT DIGS THROUGH THE
“OLD SOIL” AND FINDS “NO FAIR GROUND OF DOUBT”
In Taggart v. Lorenzen,1 the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the legal
standard for holding a creditor in civil contempt of court when such credi-
tor attempts to collect a debt in violation of a bankruptcy discharge order.
Specifically, does a creditor’s good-faith belief that the discharge injunc-
tion does not apply to its debt collection efforts preclude a finding of civil
contempt?2 In answering in the negative, the Supreme Court declined to
adopt the lower bankruptcy court’s “strict liability” standard, and the
U.S. District Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s “purely subjective
standard.”3 Instead, the Court held that “a court may hold a creditor in
civil contempt for violating a discharge order if there is no fair ground of
doubt as to whether the order barred the creditor’s conduct.”4 The Court
further clarified, “civil contempt may be appropriate if there is no objec-
tively reasonable basis for concluding that the creditor’s conduct might be
lawful.”5
The dispute in Taggart involved a real estate developer and petitioner,
Bradley Taggart (Taggart), who formerly owned an interest in an Oregon
company called Sherwood Park Business Center, LLC (Sherwood).6
Sherwood had two other owners, who brought a lawsuit in Oregon state
court against Taggart.7 Before the state court action commenced, how-
ever, Taggart filed for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code and
received a discharge.8 The discharge order provided, as with many dis-
charge orders in bankruptcy, that the debtor “shall be granted a discharge
under § 727.”9
Following entry of the discharge order, the Oregon state court entered
a judgment against Taggart.10 Sherwood next filed a petition in state court
seeking attorney’s fees that were incurred after Taggart filed his bank-
ruptcy petition.11 The parties agreed that under Ninth Circuit precedent,
a discharge order would typically bar the recovery of post-petition attor-
ney’s fees from prebankruptcy litigation unless the discharged debtor “re-
turned to the fray” post-petition.12 The Oregon state court found that
here, Taggart had “returned to the fray,” and the state court awarded
1. 139 S. Ct. 1795, 1799 (2019).
2. See id.
3. Id.




8. Id. at 1799–80.
9. Id. at 1800.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. (citing Boeing N. Am., Inc. v. Ybarra (In re Ybarra), 424 F.3d 1018, 1020 (9th
Cir. 2005)).
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Sherwood approximately $45,000.00 in attorney’s fees.13
Taggart next reopened his bankruptcy case before the U.S. Bankruptcy
Court for the District of Oregon and moved to hold Sherwood and its two
other owners (collectively, Creditors) in contempt of court for violating
the discharge injunction under 11 U.S.C. § 524(a).14 The bankruptcy
court disagreed, finding that Taggart had indeed “returned to the fray.”15
Taggart appealed the bankruptcy court’s decision to the U.S. District
Court for the District of Oregon.16 The district court reversed, finding
that Taggart had not “returned to the fray” and remanded the matter to
the bankruptcy court.17 On remand, the bankruptcy court determined
that the Creditors violated the discharge injunction and awarded sanc-
tions against the Creditors.18 In doing so, the bankruptcy court applied a
standard it likened to “strict liability.”19
The Creditors then appealed the bankruptcy court’s contempt ruling
directly to the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP), which vacated the
sanctions.20 Taggart next appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
which affirmed.21 The Ninth Circuit reasoned the Creditors did not
“knowingly” violate the discharge injunction because they held a “good
faith” belief that the discharge injunction did not apply to their attorney’s
fees claim.22 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.23
Section 524(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code provides, “[a] discharge . . .
operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of
an action . . . or an act, to collect, recover or offset any such debt as a
personal liability of the debtor. . . .”24 Section 105(a) of the Code, in turn,
brings the “old soil” of how courts enforce injunctions—namely, civil
contempt.25 The Supreme Court recognized that in cases outside the
bankruptcy context, “we have said that civil contempt ‘should not be re-
sorted to where there is [a] fair ground of doubt as to the wrongfulness of
the defendant’s conduct.’”26 Expounding upon this reasoning, the Court
noted that this is generally an objective standard.27 In declining to adopt
the Ninth Circuit’s view, the Supreme Court explained, as it had ex-
plained in prior cases, that “a party’s subjective belief that she was com-
plying with an order ordinarily will not insulate her from civil contempt if
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1800–01.







22. Id. at 1800–01.
23. Id. at 1801.
24. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) (2012).
25. Taggart, 139 S. Ct. at 1801 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2012)).
26. Id. (citing Cal. Artificial Stone Paving Co. v. Molitor, 113 U.S. 609, 618 (1885)).
27. Id. at 1802.
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that belief was objectively unreasonable.”28 Despite this, the Court noted
that subjective intent is not irrelevant.29 Whereas contempt sanctions are
warranted in instances of bad faith, a party’s good faith belief—though
not a bar to civil contempt—could help determine appropriate
sanctions.30
The Supreme Court also declined to adopt Taggart’s “strict liability”
proposal.31 This standard, the Court analyzed, “may lead risk-averse
creditors to seek an advance determination in bankruptcy court even
where there is only slight doubt as to whether a debt has been dis-
charged.”32 This would, in turn, “risk additional federal litigation, addi-
tional costs, and additional delays.”33 But Taggart argued that bankruptcy
courts often use a standard similar to strict liability when determining
violations of the automatic stay.34 The Supreme Court rejected this argu-
ment, noting that the language of the automatic stay provision, unlike the
discharge injunction, includes the word “willful.”35 Moreover, the pur-
poses of the automatic stay and the discharge injunction differ.36 Whereas
the automatic stay functions to prevent harmful disruptions to the admin-
istration of a bankruptcy case in the short term, a discharge order is en-
tered at the conclusion of a bankruptcy case and seeks to bind creditors
for a much longer period of time.37 The Court determined that the proper
standard is an objective one—a court may hold a creditor in civil con-
tempt for violating a discharge order where there is no “fair ground of
doubt” as to whether the creditor’s conduct may be lawful under the dis-
charge order.38
In conclusion, Taggart was the case to watch. Prior to this decision, a
majority of federal courts, including the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the
First, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits, interpreted the discharge injunction
to overcome a good faith belief defense.39 The Ninth Circuit’s opinion
finding that a “good faith” intent precludes civil contempt, was clearly the
minority view.40 While the Supreme Court’s opinion was somewhat un-
surprising, it reaffirms that the standard for civil contempt is an objective
one.41 Nevertheless, the case provides some comfort for creditors who
may find themselves in violation of a discharge order despite having a
28. Id. (citing McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 191 (1949)).
29. Id.
30. Id.








39. See, e.g., Internal Revenue Serv. v. Murphy, 892 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 2018); Bradley v.
Fina (In re Fina), 550 F. App’x 150 (4th Cir. 2014) (per curiam); Hardy v. United States (In
re Hardy), 97 F.3d 1384 (11th Cir. 1996).
40. Taggart, 139 S. Ct. at 1804.
41. Id.
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reasonable, good-faith belief for doing so.42 Overall, the “fair ground of
doubt” standard should strike the “careful balance between the interests
of creditors and debtors.”43 Courts going forward can rely on the “old
soil” rather than break new ground.
B. FIFTH CIRCUIT DECLINES TO RECONSIDER GERHARDT’S “UNDUE
HARDSHIP” STANDARD IN THOMAS V. DEPARTMENT
OF EDUCATION (IN RE THOMAS)
In Thomas v. Department of Education (In re Thomas),44 the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the bankruptcy court
properly denied a debtor a discharge of her student loan debt under 11
U.S.C. § 523(a)(8).45 Citing its own precedent, the Fifth Circuit declined
to overturn the three-prong test for evaluating “undue hardship” it had
adopted in In re Gerhardt.46 While both the lower bankruptcy court and
district court indicated sympathy for the debtor and the “demanding” na-
ture of the Gerhardt standard, the Fifth Circuit remained steadfast in its
previous interpretation of the law.47 “[T]he role of this court,” the Fifth
Circuit concluded, “is to interpret the laws passed by Congress, not to set
bankruptcy policy.”48
Section 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code enables a debtor to dis-
charge her student loan debt if the debtor can show that the debt, if ex-
cepted from discharge, would “impose an ‘undue hardship’ on the debtor
and the debtor’s dependents.”49 While the Bankruptcy Code does not de-
fine what amounts to an “undue hardship,” courts in this circuit rely on
the three-prong Brunner test as construed by the Fifth Circuit in In re
Gerhardt.50 That test requires that a debtor establish:
(1) that the debtor cannot maintain, based on current income and
expenses, a “minimal” standard of living for [herself] and [her] de-
pendents if forced to repay the loans; (2) that additional circum-
stances exist indicating that this state of affairs is likely to persist for
a significant portion of the repayment period of the student loans;
and (3) that the debtor has made good faith efforts to repay the
loans.51
In the Fifth Circuit, the second prong of Brunner is especially difficult to
42. Id. at 1802. “On the flip side of the coin, a party’s good faith, even where it does
not bar civil contempt, may help to determine an appropriate sanction.” Id. (citing Young
v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 801 (1987)).
43. Id. at 1804 (citing Clark v. Rameker, 573 U.S. 122, 129 (2014)).
44. 931 F.3d 449 (5th Cir. 2019).
45. Id. at 450.
46. Id. at 450–51 (citing U.S. Dep’t of Educ. v. Gerhardt (In re Gerhardt), 348 F.3d 89
(5th Cir. 2003)).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 455.
49. Id. at 451 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2012)).
50. Id. (first citing In re Gerhardt, 348 F.3d at 91; then citing Brunner v. N.Y. State
Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d Cir. 1987)).
51. In re Gerhardt, 348 F.3d at 91 (quoting Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396).
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meet.52 “[A] showing of dire financial” conditions is not enough; rather, a
debtor must have a “total incapacity” to pay debts both current and in the
future.53
In this case, Ms. Vera Frances Thomas (the Debtor) was a single wo-
man over the age of sixty at the time her bankruptcy case was filed in
2017.54 Prior to filing for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, the Debtor worked for
eight years at a call center in Southeastern Virginia earning $11.40 per
hour, including benefits.55 While employed, she enrolled in community
college to improve her career prospects with higher education.56 The
Debtor financed a portion of her college education in 2012 with two loans
of $3,500.00 through the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program
with the Department of Education.57 Her loans went into repayment sta-
tus in December 2013.58 The Debtor only made two payments on the
loans in the spring of 2014: one in the amount of $41.24 and another in
the amount of $41.61.59
Around this time, the Debtor was diagnosed with a debilitating illness
called diabetic neuropathy, for which there is no cure.60 The effects of
that condition caused a loss of circulation in the Debtor’s lower extremi-
ties, muscle weakness, and numbness and pain in her legs and feet.61 Be-
cause of this, the Debtor frequently took unpaid leave from work and
accrued large amounts of medical expenses.62 In 2016, the Debtor was
terminated for cause at her then-current employment.63 She retained
other work, but each job required her to be on her feet and she was una-
ble to maintain these positions.64 Shortly thereafter, she filed for bank-
ruptcy protection and later sought to discharge her small amount of
student loan debt.65
The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas found
that the Debtor did not satisfy her burden of showing “undue hardship”
under the controlling standard in the Fifth Circuit.66 The U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Texas affirmed the bankruptcy court’s
ruling.67 On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the Debtor argued that (1) the
Brunner/Gerhardt test is inconsistent with the plain meaning of Section
52. See In re Thomas, 931 F.3d at 451.
53. Id.












66. Id. at 451. One of the authors of this Survey was the trial judge in this bankruptcy
case.
67. Id.
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523(a)(8) and the court should instead adopt a “totality of the circum-
stances” test; and (2) alternatively, the Debtor has satisfied the second
and third prongs of Brunner.68
The Fifth Circuit declined to overturn its precedent, noting that the
Brunner test reflected the majority view for defining “undue hardship”
among the circuit courts.69 Commenting on the legislative history of Sec-
tion 523(a)(8), the Fifth Circuit doubled down on its interpretation of the
Code’s language.70 “The plain meaning of the words chosen by Con-
gress,” the Fifth Circuit noted, “is that student loans are not to be dis-
charged unless requiring repayment would impose intolerable difficulties
on the debtor.”71 With respect to the Debtor’s policy-based arguments,
the Fifth Circuit did not bite.72 Instead, “the fact that student loans are
now mountainous in quantity poses systemic issues far beyond the capac-
ity or authority of courts, which can only interpret the written law.”73
The Fifth Circuit next addressed the question as to whether, in this case
and due to external factors, the Debtor’s present inability to pay her stu-
dent loans and maintain a minimal standard of living would persist
throughout a significant portion of the loan repayment period.74 The
court answered this question in the negative, finding that by the Debtor’s
own admission, she was capable of employment in sedentary work envi-
ronments.75 Because the Debtor did not meet the second prong of the
Brunner test, the Fifth Circuit declined to opine on the third prong.76
In conclusion, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court’s denial
of the Debtor’s discharge in this case. The biggest takeaway, however, is
that that the “undue hardship” standard articulated by the Fifth Circuit in
In re Gerhardt remains good law. Accordingly, debtors must wait for a
decision from the U.S. Supreme Court if they hope to have better odds at
discharging their student loan debts in the Fifth Circuit.
68. See id. at 452.
69. Id. (first citing Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Frushour (In re Frushour), 433 F.3d
393 (4th Cir. 2005); then citing Oyler v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Oyler), 397 F.3d
382 (6th Cir. 2005); then citing Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Polleys, 356 F.3d 1302 (10th
Cir. 2004); then citing Hemar Ins. Corp. of Am. v. Cox, (In re Cox), 338 F.3d 1238 (11th
Cir. 2003); then citing United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Pena (In re Pena), 155 F.3d 1108
(9th Cir. 1998); then citing Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Farish (In re Faish), 72
F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 1995); and then citing In re Roberson, 999 F.2d 1132 (7th Cir. 1993)).
70. Id. at 453–54.
71. Id. at 454.
72. See id. at 455.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 452.
75. Id.
76. Id. (“Nor need we opine, despite the government’s urging, on the third Brunner
prong, which evaluates Ms. Thomas’s good faith efforts to repay the loan.”).
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III. CONTRACT REJECTION
A. IN MISSION PRODUCT HOLDINGS, INC. V. TEMPNOLOGY, LLC, THE
SUPREME COURT RESOLVES CIRCUIT SPLIT ON REJECTION
OF TRADEMARK LICENSES IN BANKRUPTCY
1. Background
On September 1, 2015, Tempnology, LLC (the Debtor) filed for protec-
tion under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.77 The following day, the
Debtor filed a motion to reject an executory contract—specifically, a
trademark licensing contract—it had entered into with Mission Products
Holdings, Inc. (Mission), the licensee.78 After the U.S. Bankruptcy Court
for the District of New Hampshire approved the Debtor’s rejection of the
contract, the Debtor requested that the bankruptcy court terminate Mis-
sion’s rights under the contract, and the bankruptcy court granted the
Debtor’s request.79 The BAP for the First Circuit reversed.80 But the
BAP’s decision was subsequently overturned by the First Circuit Court of
Appeals.81
These rulings centered around whether a trademark falls within the
meaning of intellectual property under the Bankruptcy Code.82 If a trade-
mark is intellectual property, then it would be afforded rights under Sec-
tion 365(n).83 If, however, a trademark is not intellectual property, what
rights, if any, would the licensee retain when the licensing agreement was
rejected during a bankruptcy proceeding?84
The extra protection afforded to licensees of intellectual property likely
stems from Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc.,85
where the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that a license
holder “could not seek to retain its contract rights in the technology by
specific performance even if that remedy would ordinarily be available
upon breach of this type of contract.”86 Following this decision, Congress
amended the Bankruptcy Code to add Section 365(n),87 which allows the
licensee of intellectual property to treat the contract as terminated or,
to retain its rights (including a right to enforce any exclusivity provi-
sion of such contract . . . ) under such contract and under any agree-
ment supplementary to such contract, to such intellectual property
. . . , as such rights existed immediately before the case commenced,
for (i) the duration of such contract; and (ii) any period for which
77. In re Tempnology, LLC, 541 B.R. 1, 2, 4 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2015).
78. Id.
79. See Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 1652, 1658–59
(2019).
80. Id. at 1659.
81. Id.
82. See id. at 1659–60.
83. See id. at 1659.
84. See id.
85. 756 F.2d 1043, 1048 (4th Cir. 1985).
86. Id.
87. Mission Prod. Holdings, 139 S. Ct. at 1664.
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such contract may be extended by the licensee . . . .88
However, trademarks are not included within the meaning of “intellec-
tual property” as defined by the Bankruptcy Code.89 Section 101(35A)
defines intellectual property as a (1) trade secret; (2) invention, process,
design, or plant protected under Title 35; (3) patent application; (4) plant
variety; (5) work of authorship protected under Title 17; or (6) mask
work protected under Chapter 9 of Title 17.90 Because Congress enacted
Sections 365(n) and 101(35A) in response to the Fourth Circuit’s
Lubrizol decision,91 it is not surprising that the definition focuses on pat-
ent rights and trade secrets, and specifically protects those rights.92
2. The Case Before the Supreme Court
In Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC,93 the question
before the Court was “whether the debtor-licensor’s rejection of [a trade-
mark licensing] contract deprives the licensee of its rights to use the
trademark.”94 The Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split be-
tween the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Seventh and First Circuits.95
The Seventh Circuit held that the rejection of a license agreement would
allow the license holder to retain the right to use the license as granted
under the original contact.96 By contrast, the First Circuit held that the
rejection of the contract in a bankruptcy proceeding would rescind the
contract and thereby void all rights to the use of the trademark granted
under the licensing agreement that was rejected.97 In an 8–1 decision, the
Supreme Court sided with the Seventh Circuit’s view, holding that a
debtor’s rejection of a trademark license under Section 365 amounts to a
breach of the license agreement and the licensee retains the rights to the
licensed marks from the remainder of the license term.98
The Supreme Court first analyzed 11 U.S.C. § 365(a), which provides
that a “trustee [or debtor], subject to the court’s approval, may assume or
reject any executory contract.”99 A contract is executory where “perform-
ance remains due to some extent on both sides.”100 The Court next
turned to 11 U.S.C. § 365(g), which provides that the rejection of an exec-
utory contract amounts to a breach of such contract.101 The counterparty
to rejection would accordingly receive a pre-petition unsecured damages
88. 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(B)(i)–(ii) (2012).
89. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(35A) (2012).
90. Id.
91. Mission Prod. Holdings, 139 S. Ct. at 1664–65.
92. Lubrizol Enters. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043, 1045 (4th Cir.
1085) (the license agreement at issue related to a metal coating finish process).
93. 139 S. Ct. 1652, 1657–58 (2019).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1660.
96. Id. at 1659.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1657–58.





Further, in Sections 365(h), (i), and (n), the Bankruptcy Code identifies
certain types of executory contracts and grants those executory contracts
special rights.103 Section 365(n) gives the license holder of certain types of
intellectual property the right to continue to use the license.104 However,
this provision would not have applied to the contract at issue because the
license pertained to a trademark, and trademarks are not intellectual
property as defined in the Bankruptcy Code.105 The Court rejected the
Debtor’s argument that because the Bankruptcy Code does not lay out
specific rights pertaining to this type of contract, as it does for real prop-
erty, timeshares, and certain intellectual property, then no right exists.106
The Court noted that Sections 365(h), (i), and (n) were added “to rein-
force or clarify the general rule that contractual rights survive rejec-
tion.”107 These sections were added to address three separate judicial
decisions.108
The Supreme Court went on to explain that only the Debtor’s obliga-
tion to perform is relieved in bankruptcy.109 The Debtor would have no
further obligations under the contract, unless otherwise provided for
outside of bankruptcy.110 In this case, that would mean that the Debtor
would not be required to maintain or defend the trademark, or perform
any other obligation under the agreement.111 However, “the [D]ebtor
cannot rescind the license already conveyed.”112 As a result, any rights
conveyed to a license holder outside of bankruptcy will remain with the
license holder after the licensor files for bankruptcy.113 To this point, the
Court emphasized the principle that “[t]he estate cannot possess anything
more than the debtor itself did outside bankruptcy.”114 A ruling in the
Debtor’s favor would have transferred the rights held by Mission to the
bankruptcy estate.115 The estate would have then been able to negotiate a
better licensing agreement without having to consider its original agree-
ment with Mission.116
An additional reason the Court rejected this “rejection-as-rescission”
approach was that it would amount to the functional equivalent of avoid-
ance.117 A trustee or debtor-in-possession may avoid certain types of
102. Id.




107. Id. at 1664.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1665.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1662.
113. See id.




32 SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY [Vol. 6
transfers under Sections 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, and
553.118 Typically, the avoided transfers involve some type of preference or
fraud.119 If an avoidance action is brought, however, the transferee would
have the opportunity to defend the transfer, such as, by showing the
transfer was for reasonably equivalent value if the trustee alleged
fraud.120 Section 365 has no similar provision related to the rejection of
executory contracts.121 The Court extensively discussed that rejection-as-
rescission cannot be allowed as that would effectively be an avoidance
without the avoidance restrictions provided in Sections 544 through
553.122 With this ruling, “[r]ejection is breach, and has only its
consequences.”123
In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision in Mission Product Hold-
ings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC resolved a longstanding circuit split as to
what rights a licensee retains following a debtor’s rejection of a trade-
mark license in bankruptcy.124 The Court ruled broadly and held that
agreements rejected by a debtor in bankruptcy does not amount to rescis-
sion.125 Instead, a non-debtor party will retain whatever rights it would
have under applicable non-bankruptcy law following a breach of that
agreement.126 While this decision may appear to limit a debtor’s tools and
bargaining power in the context of rejection, that may not always be the
case. As Justice Sotomayor observed in her concurrence, applicable non-
bankruptcy law may still terminate a license holder’s contractual rights.127
While parties may continue to litigate about what rights they have, at a
minimum, the split between the Seventh and First Circuit Courts of Ap-
peal has been resolved. Hopefully, this will result in a more consistent
and predictable application of the Bankruptcy Code.
B. FIFTH CIRCUIT CLARIFIES POST-REJECTION ADMINISTRATIVE
PRIORITY STATUS IN NABORS OFFSHORE CORP. V.
WHISTLER ENERGY II, L.L.C.
In Nabors Offshore Corporation v. Whistler Energy II, L.L.C. (In re
Whistler Energy II, L.L.C.),128 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit clarified when a claimant is entitled to post-rejection administra-
tive priority status under Section 503(b)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy
Code.129 The question: when can post-rejection damages be allowed as
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 548(c) (2012).
121. Mission Prod. Holdings, 139 S. Ct. at 1657–58.
122. Id. at 1663.
123. Id.
124. See id. at 1660, 1663–66.
125. See id. at 1666.
126. See id.
127. Id. at 1666 (J. Sotomayor, concurring).
128. 931 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 2019).
129. Id. at 440; see 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A) (2012). This provision grants priority status
to certain necessary expenses over most unsecured claims. In re Whistler Energy II, L.L.C.,
931 F.3d at 440. In bankruptcy, the court “presume[s] that all ‘creditors are equally inno-
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administrative expenses?130 In affirming in part and reversing in part the
decision of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana,
the Fifth Circuit held that a claimant can prove an expense is “actual and
necessary” within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A), “through evi-
dence of either a direct request from the debtor-in-possession or other
inducement via the knowing and voluntary post-petition acceptance of
desired goods or services.”131 Accordingly, “when a debtor-in-possession
induces availability and the bankruptcy estate derives a benefit from it,
the ordinary cost of ensuring such availability qualifies as an administra-
tive expense.”132The underlying facts involve the Chapter 11 bankruptcy
proceeding of Whistler Energy II, L.L.C. (Whistler), which owned an oil
and gas production platform in the Outer Continental Shelf in the Gulf of
Mexico.133 In February 2014, Whistler entered into a drilling contract
with Nabors Offshore Corporation (Nabors) under which Nabors would
drill two new wells for Whistler and provide it with related services and
equipment.134 In March 2016, a Nabors employee accidentally died on
Whistler’s platform.135 As a result, the United States Bureau of Safety
and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) ordered Nabors and Whistler
to stop drilling activity.136 At the same time, several of Whistler’s credi-
tors filed an involuntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition.137 Whistler be-
came the debtor-in-possession, and Nabors moved to compel assumption
or rejection of the contract with Whistler.138 Whistler elected to reject the
contract.139 Nabors remained on the platform for several months pending
the creation and BSEE approval of a demobilization plan.140
Two time periods were at issue in this case: (1) the pre-demobilization
period (that is, the four months it took for regulators to approve a demo-
bilization plan immediately following Whistler’s rejection of the Whistler/
Nabors contract); and (2) the demobilization period (the two months fol-
lowing that it took for Nabors to remove the drilling rig from the plat-
form).141 Importantly, both time periods occurred after Whistler rejected
the Whistler/Nabors contract.142 Nabors requested that the U.S. Bank-
ruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana classify Nabors’s post-
rejection expenses from both time periods as administrative expenses
cent victims.’” Id. at 441 (quoting Total Minatome Corp. v. Jack/Wade Drilling, Inc. (In re
Jack/Wade Drilling, Inc.), 258 F.3d 385, 387 (5th Cir. 2001)). Therefore, a bankruptcy court
must decide whether the creditor “deserves to get paid at the expense of the debtor’s ex-
isting unsecured creditors.” Id.
130. See In re Whistler Energy II, L.L.C., 931 F.3d at 438.
131. Id. at 443.
132. Id. at 444.
133. Id. at 438.
134. Id. at 438–39.
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under 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A).143 Specifically, Nabors requested admin-
istrative priority for $4.32 million in pre-demobilization expenses and
$2.65 million in demobilization costs.144 Whistler, Whistler’s primary se-
cured creditor (Apollo), and the Official Committee of Unsecured Credi-
tors, objected to Nabors’s request.145
The bankruptcy court held that Nabors was only entitled to administra-
tive priority for the expenses actually used or specifically requested by
Whistler during the pre-demobilization time period as the other pre-de-
mobilization services Nabors provided were “‘akin to Nabors being avail-
able to provide services, as opposed to Nabors actually providing
services’” to Whistler.146 Further, the bankruptcy court denied adminis-
trative priority for all of Nabors’s demobilization expenses, finding that
Nabors was only entitled to a general unsecured damages claim because
demobilization was only the consequence of the contract rejection and
therefore did not benefit the bankruptcy estate.147 The U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana affirmed, and Nabors
appealed.148
On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the panel
found no error in the lower court’s denial of Nabors’s claim for demobili-
zation expenses.149 However, the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded
the case to the bankruptcy court for further factfinding on the pre-demo-
bilization expenses in light of the clarified the legal standard set forth in
the Fifth Circuit’s opinion.150
Under Section 503(b)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code, administrative
expenses are “the actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the
estate including . . . wages, salaries, and commissions for services ren-
dered after the commencement of the case.”151 To qualify as an “actual
and necessary cost” within the meaning of Section 503(b)(1)(A), the
creditor’s claim must satisfy two requirements: (1) the claim must have
occurred post-petition and result from the debtor-in-possession’s actions;
and (2) the expenses claimed must have benefitted the estate.152 The
143. Id. at 440.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 440–41 (quoting In re Whistler Energy II, LLC, 571 B.R. 199 (Bankr. E.D.
La. 2017) (emphasis in original).
147. Id. at 441.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 448. In reviewing the applicable BSEE regulations in this case, the Fifth
Circuit concluded that demobilization was not necessary to satisfy the bankruptcy estate’s
legal obligations. Id. Granted, “[a] debtor-in-possession must comply with applicable
health and safety laws, and services rendered to full these legal requirements are a neces-
sary expense that benefits the bankruptcy estate.” Id. at 447 (citing Texas v. Lowe (In re
H.L.S. Energy Co., Inc.), 151 F.3d 434, 437 (5th Cir. 1998)). But here, “[t]he mere possibil-
ity that Whistler could have future regulatory obligations is insufficient to give rise to ad-
ministrative priority.” Id. at 448.
150. Id. at 446.
151. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A) (2012).
152. In re Whistler Energy II, L.L.C., 931 F.3d at 441 (quoting Total Minatome Corp. v.
Jack/Wade Drilling, Inc. (In re Jack/Wade Drilling, Inc.), 258 F.3d 385, 387 (5th Cir. 2001)).
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Fifth Circuit elaborated on this standard by explaining that administrative
priority claims arise only from transactions with the debtor-in-possession,
not from transactions with the pre-petition debtor.153 Further, “in the
context of commercial transactions for goods and services, a creditor
must show some inducement by the debtor-in-possession.”154
First, the Fifth Circuit considered whether Whistler induced Nabors to
provide post-petition services after Whistler rejected the Nabors/Whistler
contract.155 Under the Bankruptcy Code, rejection of pre-petition con-
tracts gives rise to a breach of contract claim rather than an administra-
tive priority claim; however, the creditor can prove inducement by the
debtor-in-possession through evidence of a written post-petition agree-
ment.156 Here, there was no new, written post-petition agreement be-
tween Nabors and Whistler.157 But the Fifth Circuit, joining its sister
circuits, held that an explicit written post-petition agreement is not neces-
sary.158 Instead, “a creditor can establish that its expenses are attributable
to the actions of the bankruptcy estate through evidence of either a direct
request from the debtor-in-possession or other inducement via the know-
ing and voluntary post-petition acceptance of desired goods or
services.”159
Second, the Fifth Circuit analyzed whether Nabors’s administrative ex-
penses benefitted the estate.160 “This requirement,” the court noted, “‘is
merely a way of testing whether a particular expense was truly “neces-
sary” to the estate . . . .’”161 The Fifth Circuit focused on the fact that
benefits to the estate may take different forms and are not narrowly lim-
ited to money.162 Some benefits to the estate such as the ability to con-
tinue business as usual are difficult to calculate.163 Thus, the actual and
necessary costs are not limited to costs strictly necessary for rehabilita-
tion, rather it includes the costs that are typically necessary to operate the
business.164 The Fifth Circuit rejected the bankruptcy court’s distinction
between services Nabors actually provided and services Nabors was able
to provide, finding that conducting business as usual often requires cer-
153. Id. at 442 (citing Preferred Carrier Servs., Inc. v. Phones for All, Inc. (In re Phones
for All, Inc.), 288 F.3d 730, 732 (5th Cir. 2002)). The court explained the purpose behind
administrative priority as one that serves “to encourage third parties to provide necessary
goods and services to the debtor-in-possession so that it can continue to conduct its busi-
ness, thus generating funds from which prepetition creditors can be paid.” Id. (quoting
Toma Steel Supply, Inc. v. TransAmerican Nat. Gas Corp. (In re TransAmerican Nat. Gas
Corp.), 978 F.2d 1409, 1420 (5th Cir. 1992)).
154. Id. (citing In re Jartran, Inc., 732 F.2d 584, 587 (7th Cir. 1984)).
155. Id. at 441.
156. Id. at 442.
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159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. (quoting H.L.S. Energy Co., Inc. v. Lowe (In re H.L.S. Energy Co., Inc.), 151
F.3d 434, 437 (5th Cir. 1998)).
162. See id.
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164. Id. (quoting Reading Co. v. Brown, 391 U.S. 471, 483 (1968)).
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tain services to be available, even if they are not ultimately used.165 Thus,
the Fifth Circuit clarified that when the bankruptcy estate derives a bene-
fit from inducing the creditor’s availability, the cost of ensuring availabil-
ity meets the requirements of an administrative expense.166
The Fifth Circuit next applied this two-part standard to the pre-demo-
bilization period at issue.167 The Fifth Circuit first addressed whether
Nabors’s ongoing presence on the Whistler platform entitled it to admin-
istrative priority:
Whereas Nabors would be entitled to administrative priority for the
actual and necessary costs of its presence on the platform for the
period of time required to satisfy Whistler’s logistical and regulatory
requirements, Nabors would not be entitled to administrative ex-
penses for the cost of its presence on the platform for any time at-
tributable to its own unnecessary delay, as such delay neither results
from actions by the debtor-in-possession nor benefits the estate.168
Because the bankruptcy court did not make findings in this regard, the
Fifth Circuit remanded the matter for the bankruptcy court to determine:
(1) whether Whistler induced Nabors to stay on the platform; (2) the
length of time Nabors stayed on the platform due to Whistler’s post-peti-
tion needs; and (3) the actual and necessary costs of staying on this plat-
form during this time period.169
The Fifth Circuit next addressed whether Nabors was entitled to ad-
ministrative expenses for the cost of providing services to Whistler during
the pre-demobilization period.170 The Fifth Circuit remanded this matter
to the bankruptcy court to clarify its own findings as to Nabors’s ser-
vices.171 The Fifth Circuit again reiterated its holding that Nabors be enti-
tled to administrative priority not only for services explicitly requested by
the debtor-in-possession, but also for services “knowingly and voluntarily
accepted after the filing of a bankruptcy petition.”172
In conclusion, this case provides a significant clarification as to when a
claimant is entitled to post-rejection administrative expenses under Sec-
tion 503(b)(1)(A). Notably, the Fifth Circuit held that an explicit written
post-petition agreement between a debtor-in-possession and claimant, al-
though “helpful,” is not required.173 Rather, a claimant may show induce-
ment “via the knowing and voluntary post-petition acceptance of desired
goods or services.”174 Administrative priority status incentivizes third
165. Id. at 444.
166. Id.
167. See id.
168. Id. at 445–46.
169. Id. at 446.
170. Id.
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172. Id. at 446–47. The Fifth Circuit further clarified that such costs “should include the
full and ordinary costs of providing a service, including overhead costs and other indirect
expenses.” Id. at 447.
173. Id. at 442–43.
174. Id. at 443.
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parties to provide necessary services for the debtor-in-possession to keep
operating its business, which in turn creates funds to pay pre-petition
creditors.175 Overall, this case will provide guidance to both creditors and
debtors in determining what debtor-in-possession actions may constitute
inducement and what actions will benefit the estate giving rise to an ad-
ministrative priority claim under Section 503(b)(1)(A).
IV. FDCPA
A. THE SUPREME COURT HOLDS THAT NONJUDICIAL FORECLOSURES
FALL OUTSIDE THE FDCPA IN OBDUSKEY V. MCCARTHY &
HOLTHUS LLP
Obduskey v. McCarthy & Holthus LLP176 was another notable U.S.
Supreme Court case centered on an issue of statutory interpretation. The
question presented to the Court was whether a business engaged in non-
judicial foreclosure proceedings falls under the broad definition of a
“debt collector” under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (the
FDCPA).177 If so, numerous provisions of the FDCPA would apply.178 If
not, only the limited provision of Section 1692f(6) of the FDCPA, which
prohibits unfair or unconscionable debt collection practices, would regu-
late such conduct.179 In resolving a circuit split between the U.S. Courts
of Appeals for the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits (which held the
FDCPA applies to nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings) and the U.S.
Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and Tenth Circuits (which did not), the
Supreme Court followed the minority.180 Specifically, the Court held that
a business whose “principal purpose . . . is the enforcement of security
interests” falls outside the scope of the primary “debt collector” defini-
tion of the FDCPA.181
The underlying facts involve a nonjudicial foreclosure proceeding that
occurred in Colorado.182 In 2007, the petitioner, Dennis Obduskey
(Obduskey), bought a home in Colorado and financed the purchase with
a $329,940.00 loan secured by the property.183 Approximately two years
later, Obduskey defaulted.184 In 2014, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., the
lender, hired a law firm, McCarthy & Holthus, LLP (McCarthy), to act as
its agent in conducting a nonjudicial foreclosure proceeding.185 McCarthy
next sent Obduskey a letter that purported to provide notice of the fore-
closure in accordance with the FDCPA and Colorado law.186 Obduskey
175. Id. at 442.
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responded to the letter, invoking Section 1692g(b) of the FDCPA, “which
provides that if a consumer disputes the amount of a debt, a ‘debt collec-
tor’ must ‘cease collection’ until it ‘obtains verification of the debt’ and
mails a copy to the debtor.”187 However, McCarthy allegedly did not
comply with this provision, and instead initiated a nonjudicial foreclosure
action.188
Obduskey next filed a federal lawsuit against McCarthy, alleging that
the firm had violated the FDCPA for failing to comply with verification
procedure.189 The U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado dis-
missed the suit, finding that McCarthy was not a “debt collector” within
the meaning of the Act.190 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir-
cuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.191
At issue was whether McCarthy, who undisputedly was in the “business
the principal purpose of which is the enforcement of security interests,”
was a “debt collector” under the FDCPA, such that all provisions of the
Act, not just Section 1692f(6), applied.192 The Supreme Court first ana-
lyzed the FDCPA’s definition of a “debt collector.”193 The first sentence
of the definition says that a “debt collector” is “any person . . . in any
business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or
who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts
owed or asserted to be owed or due another.”194 The third sentence of
the definition, which the Court coined as the “limited-purpose” defini-
tion, provides: “[f]or the purpose of section 1692f(6) [the] term [debt col-
lector] also includes any person . . . in any business the principal purpose
of which is the enforcement of security interests.”195 Section 1692f(6), in
turn, prohibits a debt collector from engaging in certain unfair or uncon-
scionable conduct.196 While no party disputed Section 1692f(6) applied to
McCarthy, the question became—do the other provisions, including Sec-
tion 1692g(b) at issue in this case, apply?197
The Supreme Court’s opinion was really one of statutory interpreta-
tion.198 The main canon the Court relied upon was to “generally
presum[e] that statutes do not contain surplusage.”199 Specifically, the
word “also” in the limited-purpose definition strongly suggested to the
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does not fall within the scope of the general definition.200 The Court con-
ceded that while it is possible Congress included the word “also” to em-
phasize that a debt collector includes such a business, this reading would
render the phrase superfluous.201
The Supreme Court gave two other reasons behind its decision.202
First, the Court reasoned that it was likely Congress chose to treat secur-
ity-interest enforcement differently than ordinary debt collection in order
to avoid conflicts with state nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings.203 Sec-
ond, the legislative history of the FDCPA was telling.204 The Court high-
lighted that in drafting the FDCPA, Congress considered a version “that
would have subjected security-interest enforcers to the full coverage of
the Act.”205 Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that “but for
§ 1692f(6), those who engage in only nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings
are not debt collectors within the meaning of the Act.”206
To Obduskey and other consumer borrowers, the Supreme Court’s
opinion may raise fear that its decision “will open a loophole” and permit
creditors “to engage in a host of abusive practices forbidden by the
Act.”207 Justice Sotomayor wrote a concurrence on this point, noting that
the case was a “close case” and that it “does not prevent Congress from
clarifying this statute if we have gotten it wrong.”208 Until then, however,
the Supreme Court “must enforce the statute that Congress enacted.”209
V. JURISDICTION
A. FIFTH CIRCUIT HOLDS THE TIME-OF-FILING RULE APPLIES TO
“RELATED-TO” BANKRUPTCY JURISDICTION IN DOUBLE
EAGLE ENERGY SERVICES, L.L.C. V. MARKWEST
UTICA EMG, L.L.C.
Under the long-standing time-of-filing rule, “the jurisdiction of the
Court depends upon the state of things at the time the action brought.”210
In Double Eagle Energy Services., L.L.C. v. Markwest Utica Emg,
L.L.C.,211 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit clarified that,
although courts apply the time-of-filing rule more frequently to the con-
text of diversity or federal question jurisdiction contexts, the rule is
equally applicable to bankruptcy jurisdiction.212 In this case, it meant that
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mined at the time the case was filed, even following the debtor’s later
assignment of claims it brought against third parties to one of its
creditors.213
Double Eagle Energy Services, L.L.C. (the Debtor) filed for Chapter
11 bankruptcy and later sued Markwest Utica Emg, L.L.C. and Ohio
Gathering Company, L.L.C. (collectively, the Defendants) on a contract
claim in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana.214
The district court established subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1334(b) insofar as the Debtor’s contract suit was a “‘civil proceeding[ ]
. . . related to’ a bankruptcy.”215 The Debtor then assigned its claim
against the Defendants to one of its creditors.216 The Defendants moved
to dismiss the case, arguing that (1) the assignment eliminated bank-
ruptcy subject matter jurisdiction and accordingly, (2) the Louisiana fed-
eral court lacked personal jurisdiction over the Defendants.217 The
magistrate judge agreed with the Defendants and the district court
adopted the magistrate’s recommendation over the Debtor’s objection.218
The Debtor next appealed to the Fifth Circuit.219
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit addressed three issues
on appeal.220 First, the Fifth Circuit held that the district court erred be-
cause it did not consider the time-of-filing rule in its analysis.221 Second,
because the lower court retained bankruptcy jurisdiction over the lawsuit,
it also had personal jurisdiction over the Defendants by way of Bank-
ruptcy Rule 7004(d), which permits nationwide service of process.222
Third, the Fifth Circuit addressed discretionary dismissal and venue trans-
fer; ultimately, the Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded the case back to
the district court to consider those two issues.223
The Fifth Circuit first analyzed the application of the time-of-filing
rule.224 “Although courts have not often considered the time-of-filing
rule for cases related to bankruptcy, it applies to bankruptcy jurisdiction
no less than it applies to diversity or federal question jurisdiction.”225 The
Fifth Circuit correctly acknowledged that even the closing of a bank-
ruptcy case does not divest courts of Section 1334(b) jurisdiction over
213. See id.
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cases that, when filed, were related to the bankruptcy.226 However, the
Fifth Circuit explained that there is a general rule that strongly favors
dismissal under such circumstances.227
Second, the district court’s failure to apply the time-of-filing rule also
meant that its personal jurisdiction analysis was flawed.228 Personal juris-
diction has two requirements: (1) authorization for service of summons;
and (2) a “constitutionally sufficient relationship” between the defendant
and the forum (also known as the “minimum contacts” test).229 The Fifth
Circuit noted that if the present case involved a contract claim in federal
court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, the only authority to serve the
Defendants would be through Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4.230
Under Rule 4 in this instance, the Defendants must be subject to personal
jurisdiction in Louisiana courts.231 Furthermore, Fourteenth Amendment
due process would require that the Defendants have sufficient contacts
with the state of Louisiana.232 Relying on Rule 4, the district court deter-
mined that Defendants’ contacts with Louisiana were insufficient.233
But the lower court did not consider Bankruptcy Rule 7004.234 Rule
7004 permits bankruptcy courts to serve defendants throughout the
United States.235 Therefore, with respect to the Defendants’ “constitu-
tionally sufficient relationship” with the forum, nationwide service means
that the forum is the United States.236 As U.S. residents, the Defendants
have sufficient contact with the forum such that it would not “offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” to hail them into
federal court.237 Relying on Bankruptcy Rule 7004, the Fifth Circuit con-
cluded that the Louisiana federal court had personal jurisdiction over the
Defendants.238
Third, the Defendants argued that there were alternative grounds to
affirm the district court’s dismissal; namely, the general rule favoring dis-
cretionary dismissal involving facts such as the facts of this case.239 How-
ever, the Fifth Circuit’s “ordinary practice for discretionary decisions is
remanding to ‘allow the district court to exercise [its discretion] in the
226. Id. at 263–64.
227. Id. (first citing Porges v. Gruntal & Co. (In re Porges), 44 F.3d 159, 162 (2d Cir.
1995); then citing In re Querner, 7 F.3d 1199, 1201 (5th Cir. 1993)).
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first instance.’”240 It did so here.241 Moreover, the Fifth Circuit charged
the district court with considering the forum selection clause in the par-
ties’ contract to determine whether it permitted a venue change on
remand.242
In conclusion, Double Eagle Energy Services, L.L.C. v. Markwest Utica
Emg, L.L.C. is significant because the Fifth Circuit confirmed the appli-
cability of the time-of-filing rule to the bankruptcy context. When a case
falls within a federal court’s related-to-bankruptcy jurisdiction and post-
filing actions dissolve the bankruptcy connection, the time-of-filing rule
means that a federal court retains both Section 1334(b) and personal ju-
risdiction over the case. However, district courts still have discretion to
dismiss under such facts. This is important for parties to remember when-
ever litigating related-to bankruptcy actions in federal court.
B. IT MEANS WHAT IT SAYS: THE FIFTH CIRCUIT EXPANDS
BANKRUPTCY JURISDICTION TO SOCIAL SECURITY CLAIMS
In Benjamin v. United States of America, Social Security Administration
(In re Benjamin),243 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held
that a bankruptcy court has subject-matter jurisdiction to hear a dispute
concerning overpayment of social security benefits to a Chapter 7
debtor.244 Specifically, the Fifth Circuit held that 42 U.S.C. § 405(h),
which provides that no claim arising under the Social Security Act can be
brought under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 or 1346, does not bar bankruptcy courts
from exercising their jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1334 to hear social
security claims.245 The Fifth Circuit’s holding is at odds with the view held
by the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Third, Seventh, Eighth, and Elev-
enth Circuits.246 Consequently, the Fifth Circuit’s ruling has reenergized
the debate over whether bankruptcy courts have the statutory authority
to adjudicate social security claims. Given the level of bankruptcy filings
in the health care industry, In re Benjamin highlights a circuit split of
critical significance to insolvent health care providers and debtors alike.
The controversy in In re Benjamin concerns a debtor, Kenneth Benja-
min (Benjamin), who sought recovery from the U.S. government for
amounts withheld from his social security payments.247 Benjamin was the
240. Id. (citing Al Rashaid v. Nat’l Oilwell Varco, Inc., 757 F.3d 416, 424–25 (5th Cir.
2014)).
241. Id.
242. Id. at 264–65.
243. 932 F.3d 293 (5th Cir. 2019).
244. Id. at 300.
245. Id.
246. See Fla. Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Bayou Shores SNF, LLC (In re Bayou
Shores SNF, LLC), 828 F.3d 1297, 1314 (11th Cir. 2016); Nichole Med. Equip. & Supply,
Inc. v. TriCenturion, Inc., 694 F.3d 340, 346–47 (3d Cir. 2012); Midland Psychiatric Assocs.,
Inc. v. United States, 145 F.3d 1000, 1004 (8th Cir. 1998); Bodimetric Health Servs. v.
Aetna Life & Cas., 903 F.2d 480, 488–90 (7th Cir. 1990).
247. In re Benjamin, 932 F.3d at 295.
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designated beneficiary of his sister’s disability benefits.248 In September
2013, the Social Security Administration (SSA) informed Benjamin that
his sister’s benefits had expired in April 2012 because she had returned to
work, resulting in an overpayment of $19,286.90.249 Benjamin and his sis-
ter requested reconsideration of the overpayment determination and a
waiver of overpayment.250 Although the SSA did not immediately con-
sider the waiver request, it started withholding a portion of Benjamin’s
social security payments in September 2014 to make up for the alleged
overpayment.251 After the SSA collected approximately $6,000.00 from
Benjamin, it abruptly stopped withholding the money from his monthly
social security checks.252 Eventually, the SSA denied Benjamin’s waiver
request in July 2016 and resumed withholding payments. After the SSA
ruled against Benjamin, he appealed to an administrative law judge.253
The appeal has yet to be decided.
In May 2017, Benjamin filed for Chapter 7 relief in the U.S. Bank-
ruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas after the SSA resumed
withholding funds from his social security checks.254 Notably, Benjamin
initiated an adversary proceeding against the SSA in bankruptcy court
asserting that the SSA collected $6,000.00 from him illegally and in viola-
tion of its own regulations.255 The SSA moved to dismiss Benjamin’s
claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, asserting that Benjamin al-
leged violations that first needed to be exhausted through the administra-
tive-appeal process.256 The bankruptcy court agreed and granted the
SSA’s motion to dismiss.257 Benjamin appealed to the district court,
which affirmed the bankruptcy court’s dismissal on jurisdictional
grounds.258 Accordingly, Benjamin appealed to the Fifth Circuit.
On appeal, the sole issue before the Fifth Circuit was whether the
bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to hear Benjamin’s social security
claims.259 Indeed, the primary issue hinged on the interpretation of Sec-
tion 405(h) of the Social Security Act.260 Section 405(h) of the Social Se-
curity Act provides, in relevant part,
No findings of fact or decision of the Commissioner of Social Secur-
ity shall be reviewed by any person, tribunal, or governmental
agency except as [provided in § 405(g)]. No action against the United
States, the Commissioner of Social Security, or any officer or em-
ployee thereof shall be brought under section 1331 or 1346 of title 28[ ]
248. Id. at 294.
249. Id. at 294–95.










260. See generally id.
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to recover on any claim arising under [Title II of the Social Security
Act].261
As originally enacted in 1939, Section 405(h) barred all jurisdictional
grants to the federal courts, meaning only the SSA had authority to adju-
dicate social security claims.262 In 1984, however, Congress revised Sec-
tion 405(h) to its current form, which in its plain text deprives federal
courts of jurisdiction over Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid dis-
putes under Sections 1331 and 1346 only.263 Consequently, circuit courts
disagree as to whether Congress intended its amendments to substantially
change the scope of Section 405(h).264
Here, the SSA relied on the legislative history of Section 405(h) to as-
sert that the Social Security Act bars Section 1334 jurisdiction.265 The
Third, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have previously considered similar
arguments. Indeed, these circuit courts have held that Congress intended
for the current form of Section 405(h) to set forth a bar to all cases in
which administrative remedies have not been exhausted, not only those in
which Sections 1331 or 1346 might otherwise provide jurisdiction.266 Spe-
cifically, the Third, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits agree that the 1984
amendments to Section 405(h) did not substantively change the scope or
purpose of the original statute. Recently, the Eleventh Circuit expanded
this body of law and based its holding on the recodification canon, which
states that “when legislatures codify the law, courts should presume that
no substantive change was intended absent a clear indication other-
wise.”267 In applying this canon, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that the
Office of Law Revision Counsel must have made an error by not includ-
ing in the 1984 amendments the full range of jurisdictional grants listed
under the prior version of Section 405(h).268
In contrast, Benjamin argued to the Fifth Circuit that the plain lan-
guage of Section 405(h) only bars jurisdiction under Sections 1331 and
1346—but not under Section 1334. Accordingly, Benjamin relied on the
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Sullivan v. Town & Country Home Nursing
Services, Inc. (In re Town & Country Home Nursing Services Inc.).269
There, the Ninth Circuit held that the language of Section 405(h) only
bars actions under Sections 1331 and 1346 and in no way prohibits an
261. 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (2012).
262. In re Benjamin, 932 F.3d at 296 (emphasis added).
263. Id. at 297 (emphasis added).
264. Id.
265. Id. at 296–97.
266. See generally Nichole Med. Equip. & Supply, Inc. v. TriCenturion, Inc., 694 F.3d
340, 346–47 (3d Cir. 2012); Midland Psychiatric Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 145 F.3d
1000, 1004 (8th Cir. 1998); Bodimetric Health Servs. v. Aetna Life & Cas., 903 F.2d 480,
488–90 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding Section 405(h) of the Social Security Act includes a “hid-
den jurisdictional bar”).
267. Fla. Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Bayou Shores SNF, LLC (In re Bayou
Shores SNF, LLC), 828 F.3d 1297, 1314 (11th Cir. 2016).
268. Id. at 1319.
269. 963 F.2d 1146 (9th Cir. 1991).
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assertion of jurisdiction under Section 1334.270 Notably, the Ninth Circuit
emphasized that Congress intended for bankruptcy courts to have juris-
diction over all matters “conceivably having an effect on the bankruptcy
estate.”271
In the instant case, the Fifth Circuit rejected the majority approach and
joined the Ninth Circuit in applying the plain meaning of Section
405(h).272 Acknowledging the recodification canon’s usefulness in certain
instances, the Fifth Circuit found it applicable only “in the absence of a
clear indication from Congress that it intended to change the law’s sub-
stance.”273 Finding the “most obvious source of congressional intent” to
be the clear statutory text, the Fifth Circuit held that “[section 405(h)]
mean[s] what it says. And it says nothing about section 1334.”274 Conse-
quently, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling and re-
manded the case.
Debtor Benjamin did not win outright, however. The second sentence
in Section 405(h) provides, “[n]o findings of fact or decision of the Com-
missioner of Social Security shall be reviewed by any person, tribunal, or
governmental agency except as [provided in section 405(g)].”275 The Fifth
Circuit noted that on remand “the bankruptcy court should examine Ben-
jamin’s claims and determine whether they are primarily about his enti-
tlement to benefits . . . or claim for money because the SSA failed to
comply with its own regulations in recouping the overpayment.”276 Ac-
cording to the Fifth Circuit, the bankruptcy court would have jurisdiction
under the latter because his claim would not be channeled by Section
405(h)’s second sentence into Section 405(g).277
In re Benjamin highlights an important circuit split that has implica-
tions on health care providers, debtors, and creditors. While debtors in
the Ninth and Fifth Circuit courts may adjudicate their social security
claims in a speedy hearing in front of a bankruptcy court, debtors in the
Third, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits must resolve their social
security claims through an administrative appeals process. Moreover,
bankruptcy jurisdiction over Medicare and Medicaid claims is also de-
rived from Section 405(h). Certainly, Medicare and Medicaid issues are
often tangled with other factors that lead to a debtor’s bankruptcy filing.
Curtailing a bankruptcy court’s authority to hear such issues could signifi-
cantly impair a healthcare provider’s bankruptcy case.278 Until the U.S.
270. Id. at 1155.
271. Id.
272. See Benjamin v. U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin. (In re Benjamin), 932 F.3d 293, 298 (5th
Cir. 2019).
273. Id.
274. Id. at 298, 300.
275. 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (2012).
276. In re Benjamin, 932 F.3d at 302.
277. Id.
278. See, e.g., Fla. Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Bayou Shores SNF, LLC (In re
Bayou Shores SNF, LLC), 828 F.3d 1297 (11th Cir. 2016). There, the Eleventh Circuit held
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Supreme Court addresses the circuit split, health care providers may seek
greater refuge under Ninth and Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of the law.
C. FIFTH CIRCUIT RULES THE SEVEN SEAS: COURT REAFFIRMS
DISTINCTION BETWEEN DIRECT AND DERIVATIVE INJURIES
In Meridian Capital CIS Fund v. Burton (In re Buccaneer Resources,
L.L.C.),279 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the
decisions of the U.S. District Court and the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for
the Southern District of Texas in holding that a creditor’s tortious inter-
ference claim against a non-debtor third party was not property of the
estate.280 Because the tortious interference claim alleged a direct injury
to the creditor, and was not dependent on an injury to the bankruptcy
estate, the court lacked bankruptcy jurisdiction over the claim.281 Accord-
ingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court’s order remanding
the case to state court.282 The Fifth Circuit’s holding provides guidance to
judges and attorneys on the distinction between direct and derivative in-
juries, an issue which arises frequently in litigation in bankruptcy courts.
Curtis Burton (Burton) was the Chief Operating Officer of Buccaneer
Resources, L.L.C. (the Debtor), an oil exploration and production com-
pany, until his termination in 2014.283 The Debtor’s business began to
falter and in January 2014, Meridian Capital CIS Fund (Meridian) pur-
chased all of the Debtor’s senior debt.284 While the aid from Meridian
prevented the Debtor from immediate insolvency, the Debtor’s business
continued to decline and it subsequently filed for Chapter 11 in May
2014.285 But just prior to its bankruptcy filing, the Debtor fired Burton.286
Burton alleged that the termination violated the terms of his employment
contract and that Meridian was involved in the Debtor’s decision.287 Bur-
ton filed a claim in the bankruptcy case but later withdrew it.288 Ulti-
mately, the Debtor and Meridian reached a settlement in which the
Debtor agreed to release Meridian from any potential claims the Debtor
may have had against it in exchange for $10 million.289 The agreement
was incorporated into the Debtor’s bankruptcy plan.290
Burton next instituted a suit against Meridian in state court alleging
tortious interference with contract.291 Meridian sought to remove the
that bankruptcy courts lack jurisdiction under Section 405(h) to hear claims under the So-
cial Security Act. Id.
279. 912 F.3d 291, 292 (5th Cir. 2019).
280. Id.
281. Id. at 296–97.
282. Id. at 297.
283. Id. at 292.









case to the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas,
arguing that the claims alleged by Burton belonged to the Debtor’s estate
and were thus released by the agreement between Meridian and the
Debtor.292 The bankruptcy court disagreed with Meridian and concluded
that the tortious interference claim belonged to Burton and should be
litigated in state court.293 The district court agreed with the bankruptcy
court and remanded all of Burton’s claims to state court. An appeal to
the Fifth Circuit followed.294
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the question for the court centered on
whether the tortious interference claim belonged to Burton or to the
Debtor.295 If it belonged solely to Burton, there would be no basis for
bankruptcy jurisdiction and the claim should be heard in state court.296 If
it belonged to the Debtor, the bankruptcy court would be the proper fo-
rum because the claim would be property of the estate.297
The Fifth Circuit relied on its decision in Highland Capital Management
LP v. Chesapeake Energy Corporation (In re Seven Seas Petroleum,
Inc.)298 in its analysis of the issue.299 In In re Seven Seas Petroleum, Inc.,
the Fifth Circuit held that when determining whether the bankruptcy es-
tate or a creditor could pursue a claim against non-debtor third parties,
the bankruptcy court must focus on whether the creditor has suffered a
direct injury or one that is derivative of an injury to the debtor.300 For
claims that belong to a particular creditor or group of creditors and do
not involve any harm to the debtor, the claim is a direct injury and cannot
be part of the estate.301 The Fifth Circuit used In re Seven Seas Petroleum,
Inc. as an example of a direct injury.302 In that case, unsecured bondhold-
ers had relied on false oil reserve estimates when deciding whether to
invest in the debtor.303 There, the Fifth Circuit held that the induced reli-
ance did not injure the debtor, only the bondholders, so the injury was
direct and belonged to the creditors.304 If, however, the harm to a credi-
tor comes about only due to harm to the debtor, then its injury is deriva-
tive, and the claim is property of the bankruptcy estate.305 In its analysis
of derivative injuries, the Fifth Circuit provided numerous cases where






297. Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2012).
298. 522 F.3d 575 (5th Cir. 2008).
299. In re Buccaneer Res., L.L.C., 912 F.3d at 293–94; see also In re Seven Seas Petro-
leum, Inc., 522 F.3d 575.
300. In re Buccaneer Res., L.L.C., 912 F.3d at 294.
301. Id. at 293.
302. Id. at 293–94.
303. Id. at 294.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. See id. (citing Grossman v. Belridge Grp. (In re Lothian Oil, Inc.), 531 F. App’x
428, 439–40 (5th Cir. 2013) (“The creditors’ injury (reduced bankruptcy recovery) derived
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In this case, Meridian argued that Burton’s tortious interference cause
of action was really one for lender liability in disguise.307 Meridian as-
serted that the injury was its improper control of the Debtor and that the
improper control led to Burton’s termination, making it the derivative
harm.308 The Fifth Circuit was not persuaded by Meridian’s argument.309
“As long as the injury a creditor is pursuing against a third party does not
stem from the depletion of estate assets,” the court noted, “the injury is a
direct one that does not belong to the estate.”310
The Fifth Circuit concluded that the harm to Burton from his termina-
tion without severance did not depend on any harm to the Debtor.311 The
Fifth Circuit reasoned that the injury to Burton flowed through the
Debtor’s action, namely, the request of Meridian to terminate Burton in
attempt to save the Debtor money, but not because of an injury to the
Debtor.312 The Fifth Circuit went on to find that there is no reason why
the estate should recover for a third party’s tortious conduct when it did
not injure the bankrupt company.313 In sum, the injury to Burton was a
direct one and thus, it belonged to him.314
Overall, jurisdiction can often be a complicated issue in bankruptcy
cases and proceedings. The holding in In re Buccaneer Resources, L.L.C.
reiterates the Fifth Circuit’s In re Seven Seas Petroleum, Inc. framework,
while providing guidance as to how the Fifth Circuit distinguishes direct
and derivative injuries.
from injury to the debtor (the loss of estate assets), so only the estate could sue the third
parties.”)); see also Schimmelpenninck v. Byrne (In re Schimmelpenninck), 183 F.3d 347,
358 (5th Cir. 1999) (“[A]n alter ego suit that attempted to pierce the corporate veil and
recover assets improperly moved through the corporate structure belonged only to the
estate.”); Wells Fargo Capital Fin., LLC v. Noble (In re R.E. Loans), No. 3:12-CV-3515-D,
2013 WL 1265205, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2013) (“[T]he plaintiff’s injury of a reduced
bankruptcy recovery derived from harm to the debtor—that caused by the liens—so the
estate owned the claim.”).




311. Id. at 294.
312. Id.
313. Id. (first citing Feld v. Zale Corp. (In re Zale Corp.), 62 F.3d 746, 755 (5th Cir.
1995) (holding that the bankruptcy court did not have jurisdiction over bad-faith claims
third parties brought against a debtor’s insurer because “the claims are not property of the
estate and they have no effect on the estate”); then citing Steinberg v. Buczynski, 40 F.3d
890, 893 (7th Cir. 1994) (“When a third party has injured not the bankrupt corporation
itself but a creditor of that corporation, the trustee in bankruptcy cannot bring suit against
the third party.”)).
314. Id. at 295.
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VI. CHAPTER 11
A. FIFTH CIRCUIT WITHDRAWS CONTROVERSIAL RULING ON
SOLVENT-DEBTOR EXCEPTION IN IN RE ULTRA PETROLEUM
CORP., BUT ITS PRIOR HOLDING ON IMPAIRMENT
REMAINS
In Keystone Gas Gathering, L.L.C. v. Ad Hoc Committee (In re Ultra
Petroleum Corp.),315 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit sided
with the debtors and held that the creditors were unimpaired—thus ineli-
gible to vote on the plan of reorganization—where the plan paid the cred-
itors everything allowed by the Bankruptcy Code.316 This meant that
although the creditors would be entitled to a make-whole premium and
post-petition interest under state law, the Bankruptcy Code freed the
debtors of this obligation under Section 502(b)(2).317 In its now with-
drawn opinion, however, the Fifth Circuit went a step further and ex-
pressed doubt as to whether the solvent-debtor exception survived the
enactment of Section 502(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code.318 On petition
for rehearing en banc, the Fifth Circuit replaced its earlier 2019 opinion
and removed its controversial discussion on the solvent-debtor
exception.319
The facts of the case are extremely rare.320 The debtors entered Chap-
ter 11 bankruptcy insolvent, but later became solvent “by virtue of a lot-
tery-like rise in commodity prices.”321 Accordingly, the debtors proposed
a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization that they claimed would pay the
creditors in full.322 The Class 4 Creditors323 objected, claiming that they
were impaired (and thus entitled to vote on the plan) because the plan
did not require the debtors to pay the contractual make-whole premium
and additional post-petition interest at contractual default rates.324 This
additional amount totaled $387 million.325
Under 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2), the debtors argued that the make-whole
premium qualified as unmatured interest and should be disallowed.326 In
addition, the debtors argued that 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(5) entitled the credi-
tors to, at most, the post-petition interest at a “legal rate,” not the con-
tract rate.327 However, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern
315. 943 F.3d 758, 760 (5th Cir. 2019).
316. Id. at 760–61.
317. See id. at 760–62.
318. See Ultra Petroleum Corp. v. Ad Hoc Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Ultra
Res., Inc. (In re Ultra Petroleum Corp.), 913 F.3d 533, 547 (5th Cir. 2019) (withdrawn).
319. In re Ultra Petroleum Corp., 943 F.3d at 765–66.
320. Id. at 760.
321. Id.
322. Id. at 761.
323. The Class 4 Creditors were creditors with claims under the Note Agreement and
Revolving Creditor Facility. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 762.
327. Id.
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District of Texas sided with the creditors and held that the creditors re-
ceive all that they were entitled to receive under state law in order to be
unimpaired.328 The debtors sought a direct appeal to the Fifth Circuit.329
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed the bankruptcy court’s opinion
and held that a creditor is not impaired by a plan of reorganization that
incorporates the Bankruptcy Code’s disallowance provisions.330 In doing
so, it sided with a majority of courts that have addressed the issue, noting
that “[w]here a plan refuses to pay funds disallowed by the Code, the
Code—not the plan—is doing the impairing.”331 Most significant, how-
ever, the Fifth Circuit withdrew its previous discussion as to whether the
solvent-debtor exception survived the enactment of Section 502(b)(2).332
Instead, the Fifth Circuit held that the bankruptcy court is best able to
consider the post-petition interest question because whether such premi-
ums are in fact unmatured interest, “much depends on the dynamics of
the individual case.”333 The Fifth Circuit went on to comment that “the
record reveals no reasons why the solvent-debtor exception could not ap-
ply.”334 Overall, the Fifth Circuit was “mindful that [it] [is] a court of
review, not of first view.”335
VII. EQUITABLE MOOTNESS
A. FIFTH CIRCUIT DECLINES TO EXPAND APPLICATION OF THE
EQUITABLE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE IN IN RE SNEED
SHIPBUILDING, INC.
In New Industries Inc. v. Byman (In re Sneed Shipbuilding, Inc.),336 the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that an appeal of a bank-
ruptcy court’s approval of a settlement agreement and sale of estate as-
sets was not equitably moot where (1) the sale and settlement were not
sufficiently complex; and (2) the appeal was already statutorily moot
under Section 363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code.337 In doing so, the Fifth
Circuit declined to expand the equitable mootness beyond appeals of
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 760, 762.
331. Id. at 763 (first citing In re Tree of Life Church, 522 B.R. 849, 861–62 (Bankr.
D.S.C. 2015); then citing In re RAMZ Real Estate Co., 510 B.R. 712, 717 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2014); then citing In re K Lunde, LLC, 513 B.R. 587, 595–96 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2014); then
citing In re Mirant Corp., No. 03-46590-DML-11, 2005 WL 6440372, at *3 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. May 24, 2005); then citing In re Coram Healthcare Corp., 315 B.R. 321, 351 (Bankr. D.
Del. 2004); then citing In re Monclova Care Ctr., Inc., 254 B.R. 167, 177 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
2000), rev’d on other grounds, 266 B.R. 792 (N.D. Ohio 2001); and then citing In re Am.
Solar King Corp., 90 B.R. 808, 819–22 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1988)).
332. See id. at 765–66.
333. Id. at 765.
334. Id.
335. Id. at 766.
336. 914 F.3d 1000, 1001 (5th Cir. 2019).
337. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(m) (2012); In re Sneed Shipbuilding, Inc., 914 F.3d at 1001.
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“substantially consummated” Chapter 11 plans of reorganization.338 The
decision reiterates the Fifth Circuit’s hesitancy to invoke the equitable
mootness doctrine as compared alongside its sister circuits, opting instead
to treat it “as a ‘scalpel rather than an axe.’”339
As background, Sneed Shipbuilding, Inc. (the Debtor) owned two ship-
yards in Texas, including one in Channelview.340 In 2016, it filed for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy.341 After reorganization proved “tumultuous,” the
U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas appointed a
Chapter 11 trustee.342 The trustee filed an adversary proceeding against
the probate estate of the Debtor’s principal, Martin Sneed (Mr. Sneed),
and several of his family members for “attempt[ing] to fraudulently trans-
fer ownership of the Channelview shipyard to himself, among other
fraudulent activities.”343 The trustee asked the bankruptcy court to deter-
mine that the Debtor, not Mr. Sneed, was the titleholder of the Chan-
nelview shipyard.344 Before the bankruptcy court could resolve the issue,
however, the trustee and Mr. Sneed’s probate estate reached a settlement
agreement so that the shipyard could be sold to a third-party buyer with
clear title.345
The settlement and sale agreements were executed together under the
following terms: (1) the buyer paid the Debtor $15 million for the ship-
yard, which the trustee used to ensure title to the property was free of all
encumbrances;346 and (2) Mr. Sneed’s probate estate agreed to forego
any claim to the Channelview shipyard and all other claims in the bank-
ruptcy estate in return for $8 million and an agreement from the trustee
to drop any outstanding avoidance actions.347 New Industries, Inc. (New
Industries), an unsecured creditor of the Debtor, objected to the proposal
and took specific issue with the provision authorizing the $8 million de-
posit to the probate estate.348 But the bankruptcy court overruled the
objection and approved the sale and settlement agreement, declaring
them as “non-severable and mutually dependent.”349 New Industries ap-
pealed, but did not request a stay of the bankruptcy court’s ruling.350
On appeal to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas,
the trustee requested that the case be dismissed as equitably moot, or
338. Id. at 1003 (quoting Hilal v. Chapter 11 Tr. Randy W. Williams (In re Hilal), 534
F.3d 498, 500 (5th Cir. 2008)).
339. Id. (quoting Bank of N.Y. Tr. Co., NA v. Official Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. (In
re Pacific Lumber Co.), 584 F.3d 229, 240 (5th Cir. 2009)).
340. Id. at 1001.
341. Id.




346. Id. These encumbrances included liens of a secured creditor, the debtor in posses-
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alternatively, as statutorily moot under 11 U.S.C. § 363(m).351 The district
court granted the dismissal but failed to indicate under which theory dis-
missal was proper.352
New Industries subsequently appealed the district court’s ruling to the
Fifth Circuit.353 The Fifth Circuit held that while equitable mootness was
not applicable in this case, Section 363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code ren-
dered the appeal moot because New Industries failed to seek a stay of the
bankruptcy court’s order approving the sale.354
In reaching its decision, the Fifth Circuit first addressed whether the
appeal was equitably moot.355 Equitable mootness is a judicial abstention
doctrine that appellate courts use to decline review of certain plan confir-
mation orders in favor of letting a bankruptcy court’s decision stand.356 It
gives courts discretion to determine when a confirmed plan is so compli-
cated that reversal or amendment of the plan would be immensely diffi-
cult or inequitable to implement.357 The Fifth Circuit is, self-admittedly,
more reluctant to apply equitable mootness than its sister circuits.358
Quoting the standard articulated in Hilal v. Chapter 11 Trustee Randy W.
Williams (In re Hilal),359 the Fifth Circuit explained that equitable moot-
ness is properly applied when a reorganization plan has been “so substan-
tially consummated that a court cannot order effective relief even though
a live dispute remains among some parties to the bankruptcy case.”360
Applying this standard to the case at bar, the Fifth Circuit determined
that equitable mootness did not bar review because this was an appeal of
a sale and settlement agreement, not a confirmed plan of reorganiza-
tion.361 While other circuits have applied the equitable mootness doctrine
in cases involving settlement agreements, these cases involved particu-
larly complex transactions.362 In comparing the facts of this case with
those in Aurelius Capital Management, L.P. v. Deutsche Bank Trust Com-
pany Americas (In re Tribune Media Co.),363 the Fifth Circuit noted that




354. See id. at 1004.
355. Id. at 1002.
356. Id.
357. Id. at 1003. “[T]he concern of equitable mootness is that an appellate reversal
might undermine the plan and the parties’ reliance on it.” Id. (citing Wooley v. Faulkner
(In re SI Restructuring, Inc.), 542 F.3d 131, 135–36 (5th Cir. 2008)).
358. Id. “We are more hesitant to invoke equitable mootness than many circuits, treat-
ing it as a ‘scalpel rather than an axe.’” Id. (quoting Bank of N.Y. Tr. Co., NA v. Official
Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. (In re Pacific Lumber Co.), 584 F.3d 229, 240 (5th Cir.
2009)).
359. 534 F.3d 498, 500 (5th Cir. 2008).
360. Id.
361. In re Sneed Shipbuilding, Inc., 914 F.3d at 1003.
362. Id.
363. 799 F.3d 272, 274 (3d Cir. 2015). In In re Tribune Media Co., the Third Circuit
applied equitable mootness to an appeal of a multi-billion-dollar reorganization plan which
affected several hundred classes of creditors. See id.
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involved a handful of parties, all of whom were directly involved with the
case.364 The Fifth Circuit found that the transaction in this case was insuf-
ficiently complex to warrant an expansion of the doctrine.365
While the Fifth Circuit declined to rule that the present appeal was
equitably moot, it did find that it was statutorily moot under Section
363(m).366 Mootness under Section 363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code exists
to “encourage parties to bid for estate property” by allowing buyers to
rely on the validity of the transaction.367 In effect, the statute limits the
review of a sale of estate property to the judgment of the bankruptcy
court, unless a stay preventing the sale is issued before the case is re-
viewed on appeal.368 Despite New Industries’s argument that it was not
appealing the sale (and only the distribution of funds to the probate es-
tate), the Fifth Circuit determined that the two agreements were insever-
able from one another.369 The sale of the shipyard was contingent upon
the probate estate relinquishing all claims to the property, which would
not have occurred but for the payment to the probate estate.370 Since the
sale agreement and the settlement agreement were interdependent, the
Fifth Circuit could not review one without also reviewing the other.371
Therefore, Section 363(m) prevented appellate review of the settlement
agreement.372
This case illustrates the Fifth Circuit’s reluctance to deviate from the
status quo. In acknowledging the willingness of other circuits to more
readily apply equitable mootness, the court demonstrated a self-aware-
ness of its own narrow view of the doctrine.373 However, the Fifth Cir-
cuit’s discussion and comparison of this case with more complex cases
where courts applied equitable mootness outside of the confirmation plan
context, suggests that the court may be open to expanding its view of this
doctrine should the right case arise. It is also worth bearing in mind that
the Fifth Circuit was able to deny appellate review of the sale agreement
here without deviating from its own precedent. Under a different set of
facts, it is possible that the Fifth Circuit may have ruled differently on the
equitable mootness argument in order to achieve an equitable result.
364. In re Sneed Shipbuilding, Inc., 914 F.3d at 1003 (“Our ability to produce a single
graphic to illustrate the Channelview transaction demonstrates that this case does not rise
to that level of complexity.”).
365. See id.
366. Id. at 1004 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 363(m) (2012)).
367. Id. at 1003 (citing Bleaufontaine, Inc. v. Roland Int’l (In re Bleaufontaine, Inc.),
634 F.2d 1383, 1389 n.10 (5th Cir. 1981) (“If deference were not paid to the policy of
speedy and final bankruptcy sales, potential buyers would not even consider purchasing
any bankrupt’s property.”)).
368. Id.
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VIII. ATTORNEY’S FEES
A. NO SOUP FOR YOU! THE FIFTH CIRCUIT AFFIRMS BANKRUPTCY
COURT’S DENIAL TO REIMBURSE COUNSEL FOR PRE-
PETITION COSTS AND FEES MADE ON BEHALF OF
THE DEBTOR
In McBride v. Riley (In re Riley),374 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit considered whether the Western District of Louisiana’s no-
look fee order permits the reimbursement of advanced fees outside of,
and in addition to, the no-look fee amount. Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision, which denied the reimburse-
ment of three pre-petition fees debtor’s counsel made on the debtor’s
behalf, including filing fees, credit counseling fees, and a credit report
fee.375 However, the court vacated the lower court’s additional finding
that bankruptcy courts lack discretion to award the payment of such fees
under 11 U.S.C. §§ 503(b) and 330(a).376
The straight-forward facts of the case are as follows: a Chapter 13
debtor’s attorney in the Western District of Louisiana (the Appellant)
sought reimbursement of certain pre-petition fees.377 Prior to the filing of
the debtor’s Chapter 13 petition in 2017, the Appellant and his client (the
Debtor) made a “no-money-down agreement” to pay the Appellant
$2,150.00 for his legal services in addition to $367.00 for advanced pay-
ments, including credit counseling fees, filing fees, and a credit report
fee.378 The bankruptcy court ultimately held that its standing order did
not permit separate reimbursement of the $367.00 in fees. The district
court affirmed.
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the Appellant argued three points.379
First, that the fees were reimbursable under the Western District of Loui-
siana’s February 2017 no-look fee standing order.380 Second, that the fees
are necessary “administrative expense[s] of the bankrupt estate under 11
U.S.C. § 503.”381 And third, that bankruptcy courts do not lack authority
to reimburse counsel for pre-petition costs under Section 503(b)(2) and
Section 330(a).382
374. 923 F.3d 433 (5th Cir. 2019).
375. See id. at 435.
376. Id. at 444.
377. Id. at 435.
378. Id. at 436.
379. Id. at 437–38.
380. Id. at 437. The standing order is specific to the Western District of Louisiana and
governs no-look fees in Chapter 13 cases. The “no-look fee” option is a common local rule
applied by many bankruptcy courts to quicken the payment of attorney’s fees in routine
cases. Id. at 346 (“[T]he no-look fee option generally says that if debtor’s counsel charges
no more than a given amount for a given case, the attorney fee will be treated as presump-
tively reasonable under § 330(a), with no need to provide a detailed accounting unless the
request is challenged.”).
381. Id. at 435 (internal quotations omitted).
382. Id. at 437–38.
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The Fifth Circuit held that under the February 2017 standing order, the
bankruptcy court correctly denied the separate reimbursement of ad-
vanced payments, alleviating confusion about its omission on whether
“advances . . . were not separately reimbursable.”383 The pre-February
order “stated that any advances made by debtor’s counsel for filing fees
or other pre-filing expenses were not separately reimbursable.”384 How-
ever, the February 2017 standing order removed the language and did not
explicitly address whether advanced payments were reimbursable, bring-
ing its new meaning into question.385 Despite the absence of such lan-
guage, the bankruptcy court still interpreted the February 2017 standing
order to state, “that any advances made by the debtor’s counsel (with one
explicit exception) remained accounted for under the pre-approved no-
look fee amount and were not separately reimbursable.”386 The Fifth Cir-
cuit agreed and reasoned that because of the expediting purpose of no-
look fees “it seems intuitive that silence on a given expense (particularly
a routine expense) means the expense is supposed to be accounted for
under the pre-approved no-look fee amount.”387 The Fifth Circuit also
highlighted that the February 2017 standing order only stated one excep-
tion for when reimbursement could exceed the no-look fee amount, sug-
gesting the advanced fees fell outside of the scope of reimbursement.388
Second, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court’s holding that
the advanced fees paid by counsel were not reimbursable as “administra-
tive expenses necessary for preserving the estate under 11 U.S.C
§ 503(b)(1).”389 The Fifth Circuit used a two-prong test to help categorize
what debt constitutes as an administrative expense.390 To satisfy the first
prong, “the debt must arise from a post-petition transaction with the es-
tate, rather than a transaction with the debtor personally.”391 Likewise, to
pass the second prong, “the goods or services received in exchange for
the debt must directly benefit the estate.”392 On review, the Fifth Circuit
held that the three advanced payments made by counsel did not satisfy
either of the two prongs mentioned above.393 The Fifth Circuit deter-
mined that the filing fee and credit counseling fee were “pre-petition obli-
383. Id. at 438.
384. Id. The pre-February standing order did not apply because the agreement regard-
ing payment between the debtor and counsel occurred on February 2, 2017, after the stand-
ing order’s February revision and implementation. Id. at 436.
385. Id. at 437.
386. Id. at 438.
387. Id.
388. Id. The February standing order only stated one cost that “could be reimbursed
above and beyond the no-look fee amount—the postage costs for service of the motion to
modify the plan.” Id.
389. Id. at 440.
390. Id. at 439; see Total Minatome Corp. v. Jack/Wade Drilling, Inc. (In re Jack/Wade
Drilling, Inc.), 258 F.3d 385, 387 (5th Cir. 2001); In re TransAmerica Nat. Gas Corp., 978
F.2d 1409, 1416 (5th Cir. 1992).
391. In re Riley, 923 F.3d at 439.
392. Id.
393. See id. (“We agree with the bankruptcy court and the district court that the ad-
vances of the filing fee, credit counseling fee, and credit report fee by the debtor’s counsel
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gations owed by [the debtor] in her personal capacity . . . .” The Fifth
Circuit also held the credit report fee was not a “necessary expense” be-
cause credit reports are not statutorily required to file a Chapter 13
petition.394
Last, the Fifth Circuit rejected and vacated the lower courts’ finding
that bankruptcy courts lack discretion to reimburse debtors’ attorneys for
pre-petition fees made on behalf of the debtor.395 In the Western District
of Louisiana, the bankruptcy court reasoned that pre-petition fees are not
reimbursable and should not be categorized as an “administrative ex-
penses” necessary to preserving the estate under Section 503(b)(1).396
The bankruptcy court came to the same conclusion about reimbursement
regarding Section 330(a).397 The Fifth Circuit determined that the lower
courts’ interpretation of Section 330(a) inaccurately applied the reason-
ing used to interpret Section 503(b)(1).398 The Fifth Circuit noted that
Section 330(a) did not deal with administrative expenses under Section
503(b)(1) and in fact, stated that “courts may allow compensation ‘for
representing the interest of the debtor in connection with the bankruptcy
case.’”399 Basing its decision on the discretionary nature of Section
330(a), the Fifth Circuit held that bankruptcy courts have discretion to
award “compensation and reimbursement . . . under section 330(a) of this
title.”400
In re Riley provides a necessary clarification on the reimbursement of
certain fees and expenses in Chapter 13 cases. The Fifth Circuit affirmed
the bankruptcy court’s finding that the February 2017 standing order did
not permit the reimbursement of pre-petition fees, and that the pre-peti-
tion fees should not be considered administrative expenses necessary to
the preservation of the estate. Most impactful, the Fifth Circuit vacated
the bankruptcy court’s finding that bankruptcy courts always lack author-
ity to award such reimbursements. In doing so, the Fifth Circuit effec-
tively recognized the discretion of bankruptcy courts in determining
whether to reimburse debtors’ attorneys for certain pre-petition expenses
in Chapter 13 cases.401
in this case were not necessary expenses to preserve the estate under 11 U.S.C.
§ 503(b)(1).”).
394. Id.
395. Id. at 441.
396. Id. The lower courts relied on this interpretation as a way to avoid pre-petition
costs from falling upon creditors. See In re Riley, 577 B.R. 497, 510 (Bankr. W.D. La. 2017)
(quoting In re Frazier, 569 B.R. 361, 367 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2017)).
397. In re Riley, 923 F.3d at 442.
398. Id. (“[The] reasoning appears to be derived from the analysis conducted to deter-
mine whether the filing fee was a necessary expense for preserving the estate under
§ 503(b)(1).”).
399. Id. at 443 (quoting Section 330(a)(4)(B)) (emphasis added).
400. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b) (2012). Section 330(a) provides that in Chapter 12 or Chapter
13 cases, courts “may allow reasonable compensation to the debtor’s attorney for repre-
senting the interests of the debtor . . . .” 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(4)(B) (2012) (emphasis added).
401. In re Riley, 923 F.3d at 443 (“11 U.S.C. §§ 503(b) and 330 provide bankruptcy
courts with discretion to compensate debtor’s counsel for advancing the cost of filing fees,
credit card counseling fees, and credit card report fees if they chose to do so. . . .”).
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IX. LEGISLATIVE UPDATE
On August 23, 2019, President Trump signed into law three pieces of
bankruptcy legislation. The first bill is the Small Business Reorganization
Act of 2019 (the SBRA), which creates a new option for bankruptcy re-
lief for small business debtors. The second bill is the Honoring American
Veterans in Extreme Need Act of 2019 (the HAVEN Act), which revises
the definition of exempt income for debtors who receive certain veterans’
benefits. The third bankruptcy amendment is the Family Farmer Relief
Act of 2019, which increases the debt limit for farmers eligible to file for
relief under Chapter 12 of the Bankruptcy Code.
A. SMALL BUSINESS REORGANIZATION ACT OF 2019
The SBRA arguably contains the most drastic changes to current bank-
ruptcy practice. The SBRA will go into effect in February 2020 and cre-
ates a new subchapter V under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.402
The Act is designed to streamline bankruptcy procedures and increase
the success of small business reorganizations by making the process
quicker and less expensive.403
There are some key provisions of the SBRA that are important to high-
light. First, only debtors with non-contingent, liquidated debts totaling
not more than $2,725,625.00 may opt for relief under subchapter V.404
Second, the SBRA provides for the appointment of a standing trustee for
a small business’s bankruptcy estate.405 Like a Chapter 13 trustee, the
trustee in a case under subchapter V shall perform a number of duties,
such as “ensur[ing] that the debtor commences making timely payments
required by a plan confirmed under this subchapter.”406 In addition, the
trustee is responsible for “appear[ing] and be[ing] heard at [a] status con-
ference” concerning the value of property subject to a lien, plan confir-
mation, plan modification, and sale of estate property.407 Notably, the
trustee is to also “facilitate the development of a consensual plan of
reorganization.”408
Third, the plan process is designed to be more streamlined under the
SBRA. On this point, only the debtor can propose a plan of reorganiza-
tion, and the debtor need not submit a disclosure statement or even so-
402. See Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019, 116 P.L. 54, 2019, Enacted H.R.
3311, 116 Enacted H.R. 3311, 133 Stat. 1079.
403. See id.
404. Id. (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101(51D)(A)) (The statutory cap was raised to
$7.5 million as part of the CARES Act passed in response to the COVID-19 health crisis.
As of the time that this article was edited, the cap will return to $2,725,625.00 after one
year).
405. See id. (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1183(a)).
406. Id. (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1183(b)(4)).
407. Id. (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1183(b)(3)). Further, section 1188(a) provides
that a bankruptcy court shall hold a status conference not later than sixty days after the
entry of the order for relief “to further the expeditious and economical resolution of a case
under this subchapter.” Id. (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1188(a)).
408. Id. (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1183(b)(7)).
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licit votes to confirm a plan.409 A plan is confirmed so long as it “does not
discriminate unfairly, and is fair and equitable,” with respect to non-con-
senting, impaired creditor classes under the plan.410 The debtor must,
however, file its plan within ninety days of the petition date.411 The plan
length must be at least three years and no more than five years, and all
disposable income is dedicated to the plan.412 Further, a creditors’ com-
mittee is not appointed, “[u]nless the court for cause orders other-
wise.”413 And a debtor may now modify the rights of a secured lender
with a lien on a principal residence, “if the new value received in connec-
tion with the granting of the security interest was not used primarily to
acquire the real property; and used primarily in connection with the small
business of the debtor.”414
Fourth, a discharge is not granted to a debtor under subchapter V until
the debtor completes all plan payments.415 The discharge applies to all
debts addressed by the plan except for any debt “on which the last pay-
ment is due after the first 3 years of the plan, or such other time not to
exceed 5 years . . .” or debts that are otherwise nondischargeable under
Section 523(a).416 Last, the SBRA removes the requirement that a debtor
pay administrative expenses on the effective date of the plan.417 A debtor
under subchapter V may now stretch out the payment of administrative
expense claims over the life of the plan.418
The SBRA has implemented some important changes to current small
business Chapter 11 bankruptcy practice. At first blush, the Act serves as
a hybrid between Chapter 11 and Chapter 13 procedures. While the
SBRA does not raise the debt limit for small business debtors, it seems
likely that Congress is testing whether the Act is truly successful for a
smaller pool of debtors who qualify before considering a debt limit raise.
Until then, bankruptcy practitioners should hope that the SBRA provides
some meaningful relief to small business debtors.
B. HONORING AMERICAN VETERANS IN EXTREME NEED ACT OF
2019
The HAVEN Act revises Section 101(10A) of the Bankruptcy Code to
exclude from the definition of current monthly income:
any monthly compensation, pension, pay, annuity, or allowance paid
under title 10, 37, or 38 in connection with a disability, combat-re-
lated injury or disability, or death of a member of the uniformed
409. Id. (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1189(a)).
410. Id. (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1191(b)).
411. Id. (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1189(b)).
412. Id. (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1191(c)(2)(A)).
413. Id. (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1181(b)).
414. Id. (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1190(3)).
415. Id. (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1192).
416. Id.
417. Id. (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1191(e)).
418. Id.
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services, except that any retired pay excluded under this subclause
shall include retired pay paid under chapter 61 of title 10 only to the
extent that such retired pay exceeds the amount of retired pay to
which the debtor would otherwise be entitled if retired under any
provision of title 10 other than chapter 61 of that title.419
Unlike the SBRA, the HAVEN Act became immediately effective when
it was signed into law on August 23, 2019.420 The purpose of the Act is to
exclude certain disability and death-related veterans’ benefits from the
definition of “current monthly income,” like the Code’s treatment of cer-
tain social security benefits, and to expand bankruptcy relief to
veterans.421
C. FAMILY FARMER RELIEF ACT OF 2019
Similar to the HAVEN Act, the Family Farmer Relief Act revises an-
other definitional provision of the Bankruptcy Code.422 Specifically, it
amends Section 101(18) of the Bankruptcy Code to raise the debt limit
for a “family farmer” from $3,237,000.00 to $10,000,000.00.423 As with the
HAVEN Act, this amendment became effective on August 23, 2019, and
should hopefully provide some meaningful relief to struggling farmers.
X. CONCLUSION
This Survey period was an important one for bankruptcy specialists.
Courts at all levels addressed a number of challenging bankruptcy issues
in areas of jurisdiction, impairment, discharge, contract rejection, equita-
ble mootness, and attorney’s fees. The U.S. Supreme Court issued three
decisions, one of which addressed the applicability of the FDCPA to non-
judicial foreclosures. The other two opinions focused on Bankruptcy
Code-specific issues. In Taggart, the Supreme Court clarified that good
faith does not bar a finding of civil contempt. And in Mission Product
Holdings, the Supreme Court held that a debtor’s rejection of a trade-
mark license under Section 365 amounts to a breach of the license agree-
ment, not rescission. Likewise, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit also addressed some interesting topics. In re Thomas was a much-
anticipated decision, but in it the Fifth Circuit declined to overturn the
stringent standard it articulated in In re Gerhardt concerning the dis-
chargeability of student loan debt. As with the new amendments to the
Bankruptcy Code that became law in 2019, the Fifth Circuit signaled that
it will be up to Congress to address the student loan debt crisis. Until
then, at least at the bankruptcy court level, this next year will be a year to
watch with the SBRA taking effect in February 2020.
419. See Haven Act, 116 P.L. 52, 2019 Enacted H.R. 2938, 116 Enacted H.R. 2938, 133
Stat. 1076, (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101(10A)(B)(ii)(IV)).
420. See id.
421. See id.
422. See Family Farmer Relief Act of 2019, 116 P.L. 51, 2019 Enacted H.R. 2336, 116
Enacted H.R. 2336, 133 Stat. 1075.
423. See id. (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101(18)).
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